Alvarez vs. Ramirez

GRN 143439

Sandoval – Gutierrez, J.;

FACTS:

Petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the CA for allowing the testimony of petitioner’s wife in a criminal proceeding where petitioner was accused for ransom. Private prosecutor in the said criminal case called the petitioner’s wife without objection from petitioner’s counsel. Wife testified that it was her estranged husband who poured and set the house of her sister on fire. A motion to disqualify the testimony of his wife was filed pursuant to rules on martial disqualification.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the wife can testify against her husband in a criminal case.

RULING:

The reason for the rule on martial disqualification are:

1. There is identity of interests between husband and wife;

2. If one were to testify for or against the other, there is consequent danger of perjury;

3. The policy of the law is to guard the security and confidence of private life, even at the risk of an occasional failure of justice and to prevent domestic disunion and unhappiness;

4. Where there is want of domestic tranquility there is danger of punishing one spouse through the hostile testimony of the other.

The offense of arson attributed to the husband impairs the conjugal relation between him and his wife. His act eradicates all the major aspects of marital life such as trust, confidence, respect and love by which virtues the conjugal relationship survives and flourishes… the evidence and facts presented reveal that the preservation of the marriage between petitioner and his wife is no longer an interest the State aims to protect.

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Dasmariñas Garments vs. Reyes/American Pres. Lines

GRN 108229 August 24, 1993

Narvasa, J.;

FACTS:

APL sued Dasmariñas Garments for sum of money at the hearing. Instead of presenting its witness, APL filed a motion praying that it intended to take the depositions of some Taiwan nationals. The lower court granted the deposition which was in compliance with the rules on taking of testimony by deposition upon written interrogatories under ROC. CA affirmed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a party could present its evidence by taking the deposition of its witness in a foreign jurisdiction before a private entity.

RULING:

Depositions are chiefly a mode of discovery. They are intended as a means to compel disclosure of facts resting in the knowledge of a party or other person which are relevant in some suit or proceeding in court. Depositions are principally made by law to the parties as a means of informing themselves of all the relevant facts; they are not therefore generally meant to be a substitute for the actual testimony in open court of a party witness. Leave of court is not necessary where the deposition is to be taken before a secretary or embassy or legation, consul gen. etc., and the defendants answer has already been served.

Depositions may be taken at any time after the institution of any action, whenever necessary or convenient. There is no rule that limits deposition. Taking only to the period of pre-trial or before it; no prohibition against the taking of deposition after pre-trial… the law authorizes the taking of depositions before or after an appeal is taken from the judgment of RTC “to perpetuate their testimony for use in event of further proceedings in court… or during the process of execution of a final and executor judgment.”

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Jonathan Landoil vs. Mangudadatu

GRN 155010 August 16, 2001

Panganiban, J.;

FACTS:

Respondents filed a complaint for damages against petitioner in the lower court. Trial proceeded without the participation of petitioner and declared it in default. Petitioner filed a motion for new trial but was denied. When the writ of execution was served, petitioner alleged that it is yet to receive the order of denial for the motion for new trial. A petition for prohibition was filed with CA and respondents submitted its opposition and attached to their pleading is a certification that the order denying the motion for new trial was no longer available for a deposition since trial, had already been terminated. It also opined that the alleged error committed by the trial court of disregarding the oral depositions, was certiorari or prohibition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the taking of oral deposition was proper under the circumstances.

RULING:

(A motion for new trial may be filed on the grounds of 1) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence that could not have been guarded against ordinary prudence, and by reason of which the aggrieved party’s rights have probably been impaired; 2) newly discovered evidence, that, with reasonable diligence,. The aggrieved party could not have discovered and produced at the trial; 3) and that if presented, would probably alter the result.)

A deposition may be taken with leave of court after jurisdiction has been obtained over any defendant or over property that is the subject of the action; or without such leave after an answer has been served. In keeping with the principle of promoting the just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding, depositions are allowed as a departure from the accepted and usual judicial proceedings of examining witness in open court where demeanor could be observed by the trial judge.

As a rule, depositions should be allowed absent any showing that taking them would prejudice any party.

TORTS

Sarkies Tours vs. CA, Fortades et al.

GRN 108897 October 2, 1997

Romero, J.;

FACTS:

Private respondent Fortades boarded Sarkies Bus No. 5 with 3 luggages containing important things including documents. All were kept in the baggage compartment of the bus but during stopover, only one bag was recovered by Fortades and a case to recover the value of the other bags as well as moral and exemplary damages for litigation. Lower court decided favorably to Fortades but CA eliminated moral exemplary damages.

ISSUE:

Whether or not private respondent was entitled to moral and exemplary damages.

RULING:

The court agrees with the CA in awarding 30,000 for the lost items and 30,000 for the deletion of award of moral and exemplary damages which, in view of the foregoing proven facts, with negligence and bad faith, on the fault of petitioner having been established, should be granted to respondents.

TORTS

Sarkies Tours vs. IAC

Melencio-Herrera, J.;

FACTS:

Petitioner Sarkies advertised for a Corregidor tour for Independence Day, Dizon and 4 children availed of the promo and were issued receipt under the Sarkies letterhead. Part of the trip was a boat-ride going to Corregidor. Mendoza, owner of a motorized was not authorized to operate a watercraft. The boat capsized and one of the children of Dizons died. Dizons filed a complaint against Sarkies and Mendoza. The lower court exonerated Sarkies from liability and attributed sole responsibility to Mendoza. CA reversed the decision and held both Sarkies and Mendoza liable, for the reason that the relationship between Sarkies and the excursionists was “a single operation which in effect guaranteed them safe passage all throughout. Exemplary damages was awarded.

ISSUE:

Whether or not exemplary damages was awarded in accordance with law.

RULING:

The award of exemplary damages should be elimiminated. In Munsayac vs. De Lara 23 SCRA 1086 (1968) it was said:

“it is not enough to say that an example should be made, or corrective measures be employed, for the public especially in accident cases where public carriers are involved. The causative negligence in such cases is personal to the employees actually in charged of the vehicles, and it is they who should be made to pay this kind of damages by way of example or correction, unless by the demonstrative tolerance or approval of the owners, they themselves can be held at fault and their fault is in the character described in 2232 CC.”

In the present case, there is no showing that Sarkies acted “in a negligent... or malevolent manner.”

International Exchange Bank vs. CIR
GRN 171266/520 SCRA 688 April 4, 2007
Carpio-Morales; J.;
FACTS:
An examination of book of accounts of the bank resulted to an assessment of tax liabilities of the latter amounting to P465,158,118.31 for 1996 and P17,033,311,974.23 for 1997. Details of PAN included: Savings-Deposit-ESO amounting to P9,845,800.27 should be treated as time deposits considering that its features are very much the same as time deposits... subject to DST. CTA ordered payment of DST on SA-FSD.

ISSUE:
Whether or not SA-FSD evidenced by a passbook is subject to DST?

RULING:
As correctly found by CTA, En Bans, a passbook representing an interest earning deposit account issued by a bank qualifies as a certificate of deposit earning interest.
In this case, a depositor of savings deposit FSD is required to keep the money with the bank for at least 30 days in order to yield a higher interest pertaining only to a regular savings deposit… the only difference lies on the evidence of deposits a SA-FSD is evidence by a passbook, while a time deposit is evidence by a certificate of time deposit.

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Marcos II vs. CA/CIR
GRN 120880 June 5, 1997
Torres, J.:

FACTS:
After the death of former President Marcos, Special audit team disclosed that Marcoses failed to file a written notice of the death of the decedent, an estate tax returns as well as several income tax returns covering the years 1982 to 1986. BIR issued deficiency estate tax assessment among others and were personally and constructively served to the last known address of Marcoses. No administrative protest were served by Imelda or the heir of the late President, thus notices of levy on real property were issued. Having no response, properties were awarded in favor of the government. Marcos II questioned the levy assailing that said properties were under probate hearing thus, should not be summarily levied by BIR.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the BIR has authority to collect by the summary remedy of levying upon, and sale of real properties of the decedent, estate tax deficiencies, without the cognition and authority of the court sitting in probate over the supposed will of the deceased.

RULING:
The approval of the curt, sitting in probate, or as a settlement tribunal over the deceased is not a mandatory requirement in the collection of estate taxes… there is nothing in the tax code, and in the pertinent remedial laws that implies the necessity of the probate or estate settlement court’s approval of the state’s claim for the estate taxes, before the same can be enforced and collected. If there is any issue as to the validity of the BIR’s decision to assess the estate taxes, this should have been pursued through the proper administrative and judicial avenues provided for by law.

Even an assessment based on the estimate is prima facie valid and lawful where it does not appear to have been arrived at arbitrarily or capriciously. The burden of proof is upon the complaining party to show clearly that the assessment is erroneous.

NB: The nature of the process of estate tax collection
…the inheritance tax does not directly involve the administration of the decedent’s estate although it may be viewed as an incident to the complete settlement of an estate, and under some statutes, it is made the duty of the probate court to make the amount of the inheritance tax a part of the final decree of distribution of the estate. It is not against the property of decedent, nor it is a claim against the estate as much, but it is against the interest or property right which the heir… has in the property formerly held by decedent… it is a proceeding in rem.

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CIR vs. Solid Bank
GRN 148191 November 25, 2003
Panganiban, J.;

FACTS:
Solid Bank declared gross receipts included the amount from passive income which was already subjected to 20% final withholding tax (FWT). CTA affirmed that the 20% FWT should not form part of its taxable gross receipts for purpose of computing the gross receipts tax on such basis, Bank filed a request for refund. CTA ordered the refund while CA held that indeed, the 20% FWT on a bank’s interest income does not form part of the taxable gross receipts in computing the 5% GRT because the FWT was not actually received by the bank, but was directly remitted to the government.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the 20% FWT on a bank’s interest income forms part of the taxable gross receipts in computing the 5% gross receipts tax.

RULING:
In China Banking vs. CA, this Court ruled that the amount interest income withheld in payment of 20% FWT forms part of the gross receipts in computing for the GRT on banks.
A percentage tax is a national tax measured by a certain percentage of the gross selling price or gross value in money of goods sold, bartered or imported; or of the gross receipts or earnings derived by any person engaged in the sale of services. It is not subject to withholding.
An income tax is national tax imposed on the net or the gross income realized in a taxable year.

It is subject to withholding.
In a withholding tax system, the payee is the taxpayer, the person on whom tax is reposed, the payer, a separate entity, acts as no more than an agent of the government for the collection of taxes… Possession is acquired by the payer as the withholding agent of the government because the taxpayer ratifies the very act of possession for the government. There is constructive receipt, of such income and is included as part of the tax base.


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China Bank vs CA

GRN 125508 July 19, 2000
Vitug, J.:

FACTS:
Petitioner CBC made a 53% equity investment in the First CBC, a Hongkong subsidiary engaged in financing and investment with “deposit-taking” function. First, CBC became insolvent and with approval from Bangko Sentral, petitioner wrote-off as being worthless its investment in First CBC, and its 1987 Income Tax Return, it treated as bad credit or an ordinary loss deductible from its gross income. CIR disallowed the deduction on the ground that although 1st CBC ceased to be a deposit-taking company, still it can exercise its financing and investment activities. Assuming that it become “worthless”, it should have been a capital loss, and not as a bad debt expense, there being no indebtedness to speak of between petitioner and its subsidiary.

ISSUE:
Whether or not “securities becoming worthless” be allowed as deduction from gross income of CBC.

RULING:
An equity investment is a capital, not ordinary asset of the investor, the sale or exchange in which results in either a capital gain or capital loss. The gain or loss is ordinary when the property sold or exchanged is not a capital asset. Sec 29 of NIRC on securities becoming worthless during the tax year are capital assets, the loss resulted therefrom shall be considered as a loss from the sale or exchange, on the last day of such taxable year, of capital assets.

A capital gain or a capital loss normally requires the concurrence of two conditions for it to result: 1) there is a sale or exchange; 2) the thing sold or exchanged is a capital asset. Capital losses are allowed to be deducted only to the extent of capital gains, e.i. gains derived from the sale or exchange of capital assets, and not from any other income of the taxpayer… any capital loss can be deducted only from capital gains.

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AFISCO Insurance et al vs. CA/CTA/CIR
GRN 112675 January 25, 1999
Panganiban, J.:

FACTS:
The 41 non-life insurance corporation entered into a Qouta Share Reinsurance Treaty with Munich, non-resident corporation. The reinsurance treaty required petitioners to form a pool. CA ruled that the pool of machinery was a partnership taxable as a corporation, and that the latter’s collection of premiums on behalf of its members was taxable income.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the “insurance” pool be taxable as an incorporation and its remittances be taxable as dividends.

RULING:
The Philippine legislative included in the concept of corporation those entities that resembled them such as unregistered partnerships and associations. Section 24 covered unregistered partnerships and even associations and joint accounts, which had no legal personalities apart from their individual members.
The term “partnership” includes a syndicate group, pool, joint venture or other unincorporated organization, through or by means of which any business financial operation or venture is carried on.
The pool is taxable entity distinct from the individual corporate entities of the insurance companies. The tax on income is different from the tax on dividends received by said companies, thus no double taxation.

In light of the present disasters that our neighbor Indonesia is going through, I am prompted to write my entry for tonight. Looking at the images of what has happened in Indonesia lately, I can't help but recall he same disasters that struck our country almost 2 decades ago. There was an earthquake then the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo. It was really devastating!

My heart and prayers go to our neighboring country, Indonesia. Somehow, I can't explain how sad it must be to lose someone, or even something, including your home, a place we thought we are safe. But with the forces of nature, only God can give the assurance that we are safe.

My prayer and my song, the Our Father.

Our Father, who art in heaven

hollowed be thy name, thy kingdom come.

Thy will be done on earth, as it is in heaven

Give us this day, our daily bread

And forgive us our sins

As we forgive those who had sinned against us

Do not bring us to the test but deliver us from evil

Amen.

Valenzuela vs. CA

GRN 131175 August 28, 2001

Buena, J.;

FACTS:

Private respondent de Guia spouses filed a complaint for specific performance against herein petitioner for the latter to execute a deed of sale in favor of the former. Valenzuela had sold the property to Quiason spouses thus, de Guia amended the complaint impleading the Quiason as defendant including other parties who may have acquired rights or interest in said property. RTC denied for its inclusion thus this petition for Certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an amendment be allowed in as much as it radically and substantially change the cause of action and theory of the case.

RULING:

Under Section 3, Rule 10 is not under the new rule that “the amendment may (now) substantially alter the cause of action or defense.” This should only be true when despite a substantial change or alteration in the cause of action or defense, the amendments sought to be made shall serve the higher interests of substantial justice, and prevent delay and equally promote the landable objectives of the rules which is to secure a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.

Vda de Caruzo vs. Carriaga Jr.

GRN 75109-10 June 28, 1989

Regalado, J.;

FACTS:

Petitioners are children of Gabina Machoca. The latter had her land mortgaged to Ang for 425 pesos. An additional sum of P175 was again barrowed, total amount borrowed was P600. Gabina noticed that the instrument was a contract of sale and demanded a reformation from Ang. The latter prepared a deed of agreement stipulating among others that Ang obligates himself to resell the property to the vendor within 3 years for the same amount. Before that 3 years, Ang transferred the lot title to his name. Petitioners remained in possession of the lot until 1977 (since 1954). Respondents filed an unlawful detainer case and received a favorable order. During the pendency of the case, petitioners Special Civil Case for removal of cloud on the title. The complaint was dismissed on the ground of res judicata.

ISSUE:

Whether or not res judicata is present in the case.

RULING:

The doctrine of res judicata lays down two main rules: (1) the judgment or decree of a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes the parties and their privies to the litigation and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the same cause of action either before the same or any other tribemal or, (BAR BY FORMER JUDGMENT. (2) any right, fact or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a competent court in which judgment or decree is rendered on the merit is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot be again litigated between the parties and their privies whether or not the claim, or demand, purpose or subject matter of the two suits are the same. (CONCLUSIVENESS OF JUDGMENT)

The following requisites must concur for R.J. a) the former judgment or order must be final b) it must be a judgment or order on the merits, that is, it was rendered after a consideration of the evidence or stipulations submitted by the parties at the trial of the case; c) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; d) there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter and cause of action.

The dismissed or removal of cloud had become final for failure of petitioners to appeal. While the dismissed was for failure to prosecute, it had the effect of the adjudication on the merits since the court did not direct that the dismissed was without prejudice.

Lechugas vs. CA

GRN L-39972 & L-40300

August 6, 1986

FACTS:

Petitioner filed an unlawful entry case against private respondent “the Loza’s”. Another case was filed for recovery and possession of the same property and both cases was tried jointly. Petitioner testified that she bought the land from Lasangue in 1950. Private respondent contended that the same land in question was bought by their father from the father of petitioner in 1941. Plaintiff’s vendor testified for the defendant stating that she sold the south part of the land which is lot 5522 not lot 5456 which plaintiff claims.

IISUE:

Whether or not the court of appeals erred in considering, parol evidence over the objection of petitioner.

RULING:

The appellate court acted correctly in upholding the trial court’s action in admitting the testimony of Leoncia. Petitioner alleges that lot 5522 was sold to her by Leonora, not Leoncia, who was never presented as witness in any proceeding in the lower court… the parol evidence rule does not apply and may not properly be involved by either party to litigation against the other, where at least one of the parties to the suit is not a party or a privy of a party to a written instrument in the question and does not base a claim on the instrument or assert a right originating in the instrument or the relation established thereby.

The rule is not applicable where the controversy is between one of the parties to the document and third persons. Through the testimony of Leoncia, it was shown that what she really intended to sell is lot 5522 but not being able to read and write and fully relying on the good faith of her cousin, petitioner, she just placed her thumb mark on a piece of paper.