TAXATION

CIR vs. BPI

G.R. No. 134062                                April 17, 2007

Corona, J.:

FACTS:

                  In October 28, 1988, petitioner assessed BPI of deficiency percentage and documentary stamp tax for the year 1986, in the total amount of P129,488,056.63. A letter reply by respondent was sent on December 10, 1988 stating among other:

  ... we shall inform you the taxpayer’s decision on whether to pay of protest the assessment, CTA ruled that BPI failed to protest on time under Sec 270 of NIRC of 1986.

ISSUE:

                  Whether or not the assessments issued to BPI for deficiency percentage and documentary stamp taxes for 1986 had already become final and un-appealable.

RULING:

                  In merely notifying BPI of his findings. CIR relied on the provisions of the former Section 270 prior to its amendment by RA 8424. The sentence

  “the taxpayers shall be informed in writing of the law and the facts on which the assessment is made…”

                  Was not in the old Section 270 but was only later on inserted in the renumbered Section 228 in 1997.

                  Tax assessments by tax examiners are presumed correct and are made in good faith. The taxpayer has the duty to prove otherwise. In the absence of proof of any irregularities in the performance of duties, an assessment duly made by BIR examiner and approved by his superior officers will not be distributed. All presumptions are in favor of the correctness of tax assessments.

TAXATION

BPI vs. CIR

G.R. 139736                        October 17, 2005

Chico-Nazario,J.:

FACTS:

                  On June 6 and 14, 1985, petitioner bank sold $500,000.00 to the Central Bank, for the total sale amount of $1M. BIR issued deficiency assessment for DST in the amount of 28,020.00 for the said sales. On October 20,1989, petitioner received the notice and consequently filed a protest in November 16,1989. Petitioner did not receive a reply but soon after, October 15, 1992, BIR issued a Warrant of distraint, and finally in August 13, 1997, BPI received a letter denying its request for reconsideration. Petitioner alleged prescription to CTA but the latter denied the same. CTA likewise ruled in the negative that the sales of currency by petitioner was not subject to DST. CA sustained first issue but reinstated the second.

ISSUE:

                  Whether or not the right to collect has prescribed;

                  Request for reconsideration

It will not suspend the running of the statute of limitations because reconsideration of tax assessment is limited to the evidence.

                  Request for reinvestigation

will suspend the running of statute of limitations because it entails the reception and re-evaluation of additional evidence. It will take more time.

RULING:

                  The period for the BIR to assess and collect an internal revenue tax is limited to three years by Section 203 of the Tax Code. This period is limited by Section 223

Exemptions… a) in the case of a false or fraudulent return with intent to evade tax or of failure to file a return, the tax may be assessed, or a proceeding in court for the collection of such tax may be begun without assessment, at any time within 10 years after the discovery of the falsity, fraud or omission…

                  BPI executed no waiver of the Statute of Limitations, thus it did not suspend running of the prescription. Likewise, BPI requested for a reconsideration and suspension of the running of the statute of limitations shouldn’t apply. The statute of limitations for collection “against BPI had expired; none of the conditions from the statute of limitations on collection exists herein.”

TAXATION

BPI (Far East Bank and Trust Co) vs. CIR

G.R. 174492                        March 7, 2008

Tinga, J.:

FACTS:

                  Following a pre-assessment notice on deficiency tax filed by respondent in 1986, the latter sent final demand to petitioner on April 7, 1989. Petitioner filed a protest and a waiver of the Statutes of Limitations was effected until December 31, 1994. On August 9, 2002, respondent issued a final decision on petitioner’s protest ordering the withdrawal and cancellation of the deficiency withholding tax assessment in the amount of P190,752,860.82 and considered the sane as close and terminated but the documentary stamp tax of P24,587,174.63 was reiterated. Thereafter petition for review was filed with CTA. The court denied the petition.

ISSUE:

                  Whether or not the collection of the deficiency DST is barred by prescription:

RULING:

                  In order to determine whether the prescriptive period for collecting the tax deficiency tolled by BPI’s filing of the protest letters dated April 7, 1989. Section 20 of the Tax Code must be examined:

The running of the Statute of Limitations… on the making of assessment and the beginning of distraint or levy or a proceeding in court of collection… shall be suspended for the period… when the taxpayer requests for re-investigation which is granted by the Commissioner.

                  In order to suspend the running of the prescriptive periods for assessment and collection, the request for re-investigation must be granted by CIR. There is nothing in this case which indicates, expressly or impliedly, that the CIR had granted the request for re-investigation filed by BPI. What is reflected is the silence and inaction of the CIR.

                  Given the prescription of the Government’s claim, we no longer deem it necessary to pass upon the validity of the assessment.

TAXATION

CIR vs. Phil. Global Communitions

G.R. No. 167146                October 31, 2006

Chico – Nazario, J.:

FACTS:

                  Responded was pre-assessed for a deficiency tax for the year 1990. In 1994, final assessment was sent to respondent and through counsel, Philcon sent protest letter to CIR. In 2002, after 8 long years, respondent received from CIR a final decision denying the respondent’s protest and affirming said assessment. CTA ruled on prescription and ordered CIR to withdraw and cancel assessment previously issued against petitioner.

ISSUE:

                  Whether or not CIR’s right to collect alleged deficiency tax is barred by prescription

RULING:

                  There was nothing from the respondent’s protest letter that could tell the running of prescriptive period upon which CIR could have caused the collection from respondent. The motion for reconsideration was in effect denied by CIR and prescription runs from 1994 until 1997, collection effected in 2002 was barred now, by prescription.

Kaisahan ng mg Manggagawa sa La Compana vs. Jd. Ulpiano Sarmiento

G.R. No. L – 47853     November 16, 1984

Cuevas, J.:

FACTS:

              Petitioner (Kaisahan or Union) declared for a better working condition and the reinstatement of a dismissed workers. Upon refusal of the company of the company, case elevated to Labor for conciliation. The case was certified to the defunct court of Industrial Relations which issued a return-to-work order and enjoined the company from laying off as well as hiring new employees without authority from court. However, the company dismissed and hired employees without court authority. The union, through its secretary, entered into a comprise agreement with the company waiving all claims and counterclaims of whatever nature arising out of or in connection with the present case. On September 20, 1976, NLRC served a writ of Execution to enforce an order directing the reinstatement and back wages. Respondent claimed that subject case has already been dismissed by virtue of the Court’s approval of the comprise Agreement CFT issued on order retraining of the sheriff from implementing the writ of execution. Individual complainants filed a motion however denied.

ISSUE:

              Whether or not petitioners members have the necessary legal personality to bring suit against respondents.

RULING:

              Although petitioners-members are not the original parties, they should not be deprived of their right to question the order of the CFT approving the compromise agreement since they are the ones who will stand to suffer and will be greatly prejudiced by the dismissal of the case. The labor union as a body does not have a materials interest in the outcome of the case. It is the individual members who would be adversely affected in the event of the dismissal of the case after an extended litigation. The courts may set aside technicalities, all in the interest of substantial justice.

              Generally, a judgment on a compromise agreement puts an end to a litigation and is immediately executor. However, the rules require a special authority before an attorney can compromise the litigation of their clients. The authority to compromise cannot lightly be presumed and be duly established by evidence. Undoubtedly, the compromise agreement was executed to the prejudice of the complaints who never consented threto, hence it is null and void.

Mla Mandarin Employees Union vs. NLRC

G.R. 108556                November 19, 1996

FACTS:

              The Union filed with NLRC Arbitration Branch a complaint on wage distortions. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the Union while the NLRC Commissioner Zapanata reversed the same. The Union contends that the Mandarin hotel file its appeal three days beyond the reglementary period.

ISSUE:

              Whether or not NLRC acquired jurisdiction to take cognizance of Mandarin’s appeal from Labor Arbiter?

RULING:

              The court rules that the Commission acted correctly in accepting and acting on Mandarin’s appeal. The employee who was authorized to receive payment so the respondent was allowed to pay docketing fee on the next business day which was February 4, 1991. In review of the considerations and in the interest of justice was quite served when Mandarin’s appeal was given due course despite delayed payment of fees… the reglementary period confers a directory, not a mandatory, power to dismiss an appeal…

St. Martin Funeral vs. NLRC

G.R. 130866                September 16, 1998               295 SCRA 494

Regalado, J.:

FACTS:

              Respondent Aricayos filed a complaint for illegal dismissal to the labor arbiter. There being no employer-employee relationship between the two, petition was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Arcayos appealed to NLRC cotending errors of the labor arbiter.

ISSUE:

              Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over NLRC appeals?

RULING:

              First established in 1972, decisions of NLRC were declared to be appealable to the Secretary of labor and, ultimately to the President. But under the present state law, there is no provision for appeals from NLRC decisions. The court held that there is an underlying power of the courts to scrutinize the acts of such agencies on questions of law and jurisdiction even though not right of review is given by statute, that the purpose of jurisdiction review is to keep the administrative agency within its jurisdiction and protect the substantial rights of the parties; and that is part of the checks and balances which restricts the separation of powers and forestalls arbitrary and unjust jurisdictions.

              Subsequently under RA 7902, effective March 1995, the mode for judicial review over NLRC decisions in that of a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. The same confuses by declaring that the CA has no appellate jurisdiction over decisions falling within the appellate jurisdiction of SC, including the NLRC decisions.

              Therefore, all references in the amended Section 9 of BP 129 to supposed appeals from NLRC to SC are interpreted and hereby declared to mean and refer to petitions for certiorari under Rule 65. All such petitions should henceforth be initially filed in the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as appropriate forum for the relief desired.

              Case remanded to CA.

Master Tours and Travel vs. CA

G.R. No. 105409                     March 1, 1993

Padilla, J.:

FACTS:

              On February 28, 191, summons, together with a copy of the complaint for sum of money filed by the private respondent, Cathay and an order of attachment dated February 21, 1991 were served upon and received by petitioner. Pursuant to the order the Sheriff immediately lovied upon properties of the petitioner, with value equivalent to Cathay’s claim. Master Tours moved to set aside the order because there was no prior notice on hearing before the issuance of the writ. Allegedly, respondent coerced petitioner to enter into a compromise agreement. Petitioner however, filed a motion to dismiss the petition.

ISSUE:

              Whether or not a writ preliminary attachment issued by the trial court, ex parte prior to notice and hearing proper?

RULING:

              A preliminary attachment may be defined as the provisional remedy in virtue of which a plaintiff may have the property of the adverse party taken into the custody of the court as security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered.

              It is a remedy which pirely statutory in respect of which the law requires a strict construction of the provisions granting it.

              On the issue of the permissibility of withdrawing a compromise agreement which has not been approved by court. The rule is that a judgment rendered in accordance with a compromise agreement is immediately executory unless a motion is filed to set aside the agreement on ground of fraud, mistake or duress in which case, appeal may be taken against the order denying the motion. The compromise agreement in question, is a valid document binding not only on the Executive VP, but also on the defendant corporation itself. It is not vitiated by what the EUP and the lawyer representing both call-lack of authority and threat and intimiolation that compelled them to sign it. The propriety or impropriety of withdrawing the compromise agreement is more of a question of fact than of law.

Filinvest vs. CIR/CTA

G.R. No 146941                      August 9, 2007

Nachura, J.:

FACTS:

              Petitioner claimed for a refund or in the alternative, issuance of a tax credit certificate (TCC) in the amount of P 4,178,134.00 representing excess creditable withholding taxes for taxable years 1994,1995 and 1996. CTA dismissed the case for insufficiency of evidence its 1997 income tax return. CA assailed the decision of CTA and denied petition of Filinvest. The SC initially denied petition for review but on April 3, 2002, case was re-filed on a petition for reconsideration.

ISSUE:

              Whether petitioner is entitled to the tax credit anent insufficient evidence.

RULING:

              CA erred in ruling that petitioner failed to discharge the burden of proving that it is entitled to the refund because of the latter’s failure to attach its 1997 ITR.

              It is worth nothing that under Section 230 of NIRC and Section 10 of Revenue Regulation No. 12-84, the CIR is given the power to grant a tax credit or refund even without a written claim therefore, if the former determines from the face of the return that payment had clearly been erroneously made. The CIR’s function is not merely to receive the claims for refund but it is also given the positive duty to determine the veracity of such claim.

              Simply by exercising the CIR’s power to examine and verify petitioner’s claim for tax exemption are granted by law, respondent CIR could have easily verified petitioner’s claim by representing the latter’s 1997 ITR, the original of which it has in its files. Hence, under solutio indebiti, the Government has to restore to petitioners the sums representing erroneous payments of taxes.

TAXATION

CIR vs. Rosemarie Acosta

G.R. No. 154068                     August 3, 2007

Quisombing, J.:

FACTS:

              Acosta is an employee of Intel and was assigned in a foreign country. During that period Intel withheld the taxes due and remitted them to BIR. Respondent claimed overpayment of taxes and filed petition for review with CTA. CTA dismissed the petition for failure to file a written claim for refund with the CIR a condition precedent to the filing of a petition for review with the CTA. CA reversed the decision reasoning that Acosta’s filing of an amended return indicating an overpayment was sufficient compliance with the requirement of a written claim.

ISSUE:

              Whether or not CTA has jurisdiction to take cognizance of respondent’s petition for review.

RULING:

              A party seeking an administrative rimedy must not merely initiate the prescribed administrative procedure to obtain relie but also to pursue it to its appropriate conclusion before seeking judicial intervention in order to give administrative agency an opportunity to decide the matter itself correctly and prevent unnecessary and premature resort to court action. At the time respondent filed her amended return, the 1997, NIRC was not yet in effect, hence respondent had no reason to think that the filing of an amended return would constitute the written claim required by law.

              CTA likewise stressed that even the date of filing of the Final Adjustment return was omitted, inadvertently or otherwise, by respondent in her petition for review. This is fatal to respondent’s claim, for it deprived the CTA of its jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.

              Finally, revenue statutes are substantive laws and in no sense must with that of remedial laws. Revenue laws are not intended to be liberally constructed.

TAXATION

Atlas Consolidated Mining vs. CIR

G.R. 145526                March 16, 2007

Corona, J.:

FACTS:

              Petitioner presented to CIR applications for refund or tax credit of excess input taxes attributed from petitioner’s sales of gold on the theory that these were zero-related transactions under Sec 160 (6) of Tax Code 1986. CTA denied petition on grounds of prescription and insufficiency of evidence. The CTA and CA both found petitioner failed to comply with the evidentiary requirements for claims for tax refund.

ISSUE:

              Whether or not petitioner submitted  sufficient evidence to justify grant of refund.

RULING:

              CIR approved petitioner’s applications for zero-rating of its sales of gold to some companies. It has always been ruled that those seeking tax refunds or credits bear the burden of proving factual bases of their claims and of showing that the legislative entitled them to such claims.

              A photocopy of the purchase invoice or receipt evidencing the VAT paid shall be submitted together with the application for tax refund. CTA circular 1-95 likewise required submission of invoices or receipts showing the amounts of tax paid.

              Both Courts correctly observed that petitioner never submitted nay of the invoices or receipts required and held this omission to be fatal to its cause. A judicial claim for refund or tax credit in CTA is by no means in original action but rather an appeal by way of petition for review of a previous unsuccessful administrative claim. Next, cases filed in CTA are litigated de novo. Thu8s, a petitioner should prove every minute aspect of its case by presenting, formally offering and submitting its evidence to the CTA.

              While CTA is not governed by technical rules of evidence, as rules of procedure are not ends in themselves but are primarily intended as tools in the administration of justice, the presentation of the purchase receipts is no0t a mere procedural technically which may be disregarded considering that it is the only means by which the CTA may ascertain and verify the truth of claims.

Cagayan Valley Drug vs. CIR

GR 151413                  February 13, 2008

Velasco, J.:

FACTS:

              Petitioner filed with BIR a claim for tax refund of the full amount of the 20% sales discount it granted to senior citizens for the year 1995. BIR inaction prompted petitioner to file petition for review before CTA in order to forestall the 2-year prescriptive period. CTA dismissed/rejected refund as discount extended to Senior Citizens in granted as tax credit and not refund. CTA reasoned that while petitioner may be qualified for a tax credit, it cannot be so extended on account of its net loss in 1995. CA dismissed petition on procedural grounds.

ISSUE:

              Whether or not petition is entitled to a tax refund or tax credit of 20% sales discount granted to senior citizens under RA 7432 or whether the deduction should be treated as a deduction from gross income.

RULING:

              Appellate Tax Court correctly ruled that the 20% sales discounts petitioner granted to qualified senior citizens should be deducted from petitioner’s income tax due and not from gross sales as erroneously provided in RR 2-94. However, CTA erred in denying the tax credit to petitioner on the ground that petitioner had suffered net loss in 1995, and ruling that the tax credit is unavailing.

              The fact that petitioner suffered a net loss in 1995 will not make the tax credit due to petitioner unavailable. This is the core issue resolved in Central Luzon (case) where it was ruled that the net loss for a taxable years does not bar the grant and of the tax credit to a taxpayer pursuant to RA 7432 and the prior tax payments are not required for such grant.

 PLDT vs. CIR

GR 157264                  January 31, 2008

Carpio Morales;J.:

FACTS:

              PLDT terminated and compensated affected employees in compliance with labor law requirements. It deducted from separation pay withholding taxes and remitted the same to BIR. In 1997, it filed a claim for tax refund and CTA contended that petitioner failed to show proof of payment of separation pay and remittance of the alleged with held taxes. CA dismissed the same and PLDT^ assailed the decision arguing against the need for proof that the employees received their separation pay and proffers actually received by terminated employees.

ISSUE:

              Whether or not the withholding taxes remitted to the BIR should be refunded for having been erroneously withheld and paid to the latter.

RULING:

              Tax refunds, like tax exemptions, are considered strictly against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority, and the taxpayer bears the burden of establishing the factual basis of his claim for a refund.

              A taxpayer must do two things to be able to successfully make a claim for tax refund: a) declare the income payments it received as part of its gross income and b) establish the fact of withholding.

              At all events, the alleged newly discovered evidence that PLDT seeks to offer does not suffice to established its claim for refund as it would still have to comply with Revenue Regulation 6-85 by proving that the redundant employees on whose behalf it filed the claim for refund, declared the separation pay received as part of their gross income. The same Revenue Regulation required that the facts of withholding is established by a copy of the statement duly issued by the payor to the payee showing the amount paid and the amount of tax withhold therefrom.

Stateland Investment Corp vs. CIR

G.R. 171956                January 18, 2008

Sandoval-Guiterrez, J.:

FACTS:

              Petitioner filed income tax return for 1997 having an accumulated tax credits of P23,632,959.05 from which 1997 tax was deducted, leaving P13,929,793.51 unutilized. Petitioner opted to apply this amount as tax credit to the succeeding taxable year 1998. For 1998, petitioner still had an unutilized tax credit after deducting 1998 tax, thus filed for a refund. CTA ruled that failure of petitioner to present its 1999 corporate annual income tax return shows that it incurred a net loss thus no tax liability.

ISSUE:

              Whether or not petitioner is entitles to the refund representing the excess creditable withholding tax for 1997.

RULING:

              A corporation entitled to a refund of excess creditable withholding tax may either obtain the refund or credit the amount to the succeeding taxable year. Sec 76 states “In case the corporation is entitled to a refund of the excess estimated quarterly taxes paid, the refundable amount shown on its final adjustment return may be credited against the estimated quarterly income tax liabilities for the taxable quarters of the succeeding taxable years.”

              Petitioner filed with BIR its claim for the refund within the two-year statutory limitation. Both CTA and CA failed to consider that petitioner’s intention was to apply the tax credit to 1997 to its income tax due for 1998. It was not necessary for petitioner to file it ITR for 1999, thus requiring ITR of the succeeding year be presented has no basis in law.

              This Court held that if a tax payer suffered a net loss in the succeeding year, incurring no tax liability to which a previous years tax credit could be applied there is no reason for BIR to withhold the refund that rightfully belongs to the tax payer.

Systra Phils vs. CIR

September 21, 2007               G.R. 176290

Corona, J.:

FACTS:

              This is a case where a second motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner. Systra likewise questioned the substantive aspect of CTA decisions. The facts on the tax case.

              Petitioner had creditable taxes which they opted to carry over to the succeeding year 2001. In 2001 ITR, it indicated that creditable withholding taxes will also be carried over to next year’s tax as credit. However, on August 9, 2001, petitioner instituted a claim for refund of its unutilized creditable withholding taxes. Due to BIR’s inaction, petitioner filed a petition for review. CTA partially granted the petition but denied claim for refund because petitioner was precluded from claiming a refund. Once it was made for a particular taxable period, the option to carry over become irrevocable.

ISSUE:

              Whether or not the exercise of the option to carry-over excess income tax credits bars a taxpayer from claiming the excess tax credits for refund.

RULING:

              It was in the year 2000 that petitioner derived excess tax credits and exercised the irrevocable option to carry them over as tax credits for the next taxable year. The excess credits will only be applied “against income tax due for the taxable quarters of the succeeding taxable years.”

              Section 76 of the present tax c ode formulates an irrevocability rule which stresses and fortifies the nature of the remedies or options as alternative, not cumulative. It also provides that the excess tax credits “may be carried over and credited against the estimated quarterly income tax liabilities for the taxable quarters of the succeeding taxable years until fully utilized.

              Nevertheless, the amount will not be forfeited in favor of the government but will remain in the taxpayer’s account.”

SUCCESSION

Solano vs. CA, Bienvenido/Emeteria Garcia

GR L 41971 November 29, 1983

FACTS:

Bienvenido and Emeteria filed an action for recognition against Melita Solano Meliton died during the pendency of the petition and his daughter substituted him while asking for the probate of the will of the decedent. RTC specified the legal issues as 1) the recognition of Garcias, 2) correct status of Zonia, 3) the hereditary share of each of them in view of the probated will. In deciding, RTC declared Garcias as illegitimate children of late Meliton.; the institution of Sonia as sole heir declared null and void, the 3 children shall share equally the estate CA affirmed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not total intestacy resulted from the declaration that the institution of sole heir from decedent’s will.

RULING:

That being compulsory heirs, the Garcias were preterited from Meliton’s will, and as a result, Sonia’s institution as sole heir is null and void pursuant to Art. 854

“The preterition or omission of one, some or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir, but the devises and legacies shall be valid…

The intention of the decedent is to favor Sonia with certain portions of his property which the testator had the right to such so that it should be upheld as to the one-half portion of the property that the testator could freely dispose of Sonia’s share is hereby declared to be 4/6 of the estate and Garcias 1/6 each. The usufruct in favor of will should not be invalidated all together.

Seangio vs. Hon. Amor A. Reyes

G.R. November 27, 2006

Azcuna, J.:

FACTS:

On September 1988, private respondents filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of the late Segundo. Petitioners opposed assailing among others that Segundo left a holographic will which is entirely a declaration of disinheritance affecting Alfredo, one of the private respondents. Private respondents opposed the probate on the ground that the holographic will did not contain any disposition of the estate of the deceased. RTC dismissed the petition for probate easoning that the holographic will clearly shows preterition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the document executed by Segundo can be considered as a holographic will.

RULING:

A holographic will must be written, dated and signed by the testator himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa can be clearly deducted from the terms of the instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative deposition of the latter’s property, the disinheritance of Alfredo, is an act of disposition in itself. The disinheritance results in the disposition of the property in favor of those who would succeed in the absence of Alfredo.

With regard to the issue on preterition, the court believes that the compulsory heirs in the direct line were not preterited in the will. It was Segundo’s last expression bequeath his estate to all his compulsory heirs, with the sole exception of Alfredo.

Bonilla vs. Leon Barcena

G.R. No. L-41715 June 18, 1976

Martin, J.:

FACTS:

On March 31, 1975 Fortunata Bonilla, mother of minors Rosalio and Salvacion, wife of Ponciano Bonilla (petitioner) instituted a civil action to quiet title over certain parcles of land located in Abra. Respondents opposed and when Fortunata died, moved to dismiss the same since a dead person has no legal capacity to sue. CFI dismissed the civil action earlier instituted and although counsel for the plaintiff prayed that Rosalio and Salvacion be allowed to substitute their deceased mother, the same was dismissed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not children of the deceased be allowed to substitute the deceased plaintiff.

RULING:

If the plaintiff dies, the Rules of Court prescribes the procedure whereby a party who died during the pendency of the proceeding can be substituted.

Rule 16, Sec 3 ROC states, “whenever a party to a pending case dies… it shall be the duty of his attorney to inform the court promptly of such death… and to give the name and residence of his executor, administrator, guardian or other legal representative.”

This duty was complained with by the counsel for the deceased plaintiff but the court, instead of allowing the substitution, dismissed the petition on the ground that a dead person has no legal personality to sue. Art 777 NCC provides “the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent.

When Fortunata therefore died, her claim or right to the parcels of land in litigation was not extinguished but was transferred to her heirs upon death.

(BLR Registry of Union & CBA file)

Liberty Flour Mills Employees vs Liberty Flour

G.RN - 58768 December 29, 1989

Cruz, J:

Facts:

On February 6, 1974, respondent Philippine Labor Alliance Council (PLAC) and Liberty Flour entered into a 3-year CBA effective January 1, 1974 providing for a daily wage increase of PhP2.00 for 1974, PhP1.00 for 1975 and PhP1.00 for 1976. The parties also agreed to establish a union shop by imposing “membership in good standing for the duration of CBA” as a condition for continued employment of workers. PLAC complained against the company for non-payment of E-COLA under P.D. 525. A similar complaint was filed on March 4, 1975, this time by petitioners who apparently were veering away from PLAC. Evaristo and Biascan, after organizing a union, filed for a certification election among rank-and-file employees. PLAC then expelled the two for disloyalty and demanded their dismissal by the respondent company, who complied on May 20, 1975. The claims for E-COLA was dismissed as it was already absorbed by the wage increase. The termination case in relation to back wages was also dismissed.

Issue:

Whether or not E_COLA was also absorbed in the wage increases and won dismissal of Evaristo and Biascan was illegal.

Ruling:

The company agreed to grant the emergency allowance even before the obligation was imposed by government (P.D. 525). What the petitioners claim they are being made to waive is the additional allowance but the truth is they are not entitled to because they are already enjoying the stipulated increases.

As with the case of illegal dismissal, the CBA concluded in 1974 was certifiable and in fact certified in April 11, 1975 while the two were dismissed on may 20, 1975. Evidence show that after the cancellation of the registration certificate of the Federation of Democratic Labor Unions, no other union contested the exclusive representation of the PLAC, consequently there was no more legal impediment that stood on the way of its validity and enforceability of the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement entered into by and between respondent corporation and respondent union. Once it was duly entered into and signed by the parties, a collective bargaining agreement becomes effective as between the parties regardless of won the same has been certified by the BLR.

Labor Employee Representation and Participation

Meralco vs Quisumbing

GRN 127598 january 27, 1999

Ynares – Santiago, J.

Facts:

The court directed the parties to execute of CBA incorporating the terms among which are the following modified.

Wages: P 1,900 for 1995-96

Retroactivity: December 28, 1996- December 27, 1999

Dissatisfied, some members of the union filed a motion for intervention/reconsideration Petition warns that if the wage increased of the P 2, 200 per month as ordered is allowed, it would pass the cost covering such increase rate of electricity, on the retroactivity of the CBA arbitral award, the parties reckon the period as when retraction shall commerce.

Issue:

Whether or not retroactivity of arbitral awards shall commerce as such time as granted by Secretary.

Ruling:

In St. Luke’s Medical vs. Torres, a deadlock developed during CBA negotiations between management unions. The Secretary assumed jurisdiction and ordered the retroaction of the CBA to the date of expiration to the previous CBA. The court ratiocinated thus, in the absence of the specific provision of law prohibiting retroactive of the affectivity of arbitral awards issued by the Secretary pursuant to art 263 (9) of the labor code, public respondent is deemed vested with plenary and discretionary power to determine the affectivity thereof.

In general, a CBA negotiated within six months after the expiration of the existing CBA retroacts to the day immediately following such date and if agreed thereafter, the affectivity depends on the agreement of the parties. On the other hand, the law is silent is as to the retroactivity of a CBA arbitral award or that granted not by virtue of the mutual agreement of the parties but by intervention of the government. In the absence of CBA, the Secretary’s determination of the date of retroactivity is part os his discretionary power over arbitral awards shall control.

Whereof, the arbitral award shall retroact from December 1, 1995 to November 30, 1997; and the award of wage is increased from 1,900 to P 2,000

This is case digest for today:

Infante vs. Cunanan

G.R L- 5180 August 31, 1953

Bautista Angelo, J:

Facts:

Infante was the owner of the land with a house built on it. Cunanan and Mijares were contracted to sell the property from which they would receive commission. Noche agreed to purchase the lot but Infante informed C & M about her change of mind to sell the lot and had them sign a document stating that their authority to sell was already cancelled. Subsequently, Infante sold the lot & house to Noche. Defendants herein demanded for their commission. RTC ordered Infante to pay commission. CA affirmed.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner was duty bound to pay commission notwithstanding that authority to sell has been cancelled.

Ruling:

A principal may withdraw the authority given to an agent at will. But respondents agreed to cancel the authority given to them upon assurance by petitioner that should property be sold to Noche, they would be given commission.

That petitioner had changed her mind even if respondents had found a buyer who was willing to close the deal, is a matter that would give rise to a legal consequence if respondents agree to call off to transaction in deference to the request of the petitioner. Petitioner took advantage of the services of respondents, but believing that she could evade payment of their commission, she made use of a ruse by inducing them to sign the deed of cancellation. This act of subversion cannot be sanctioned and cannot serve as basis for petitioner to escape payment of the commissions agreed upon.

Commissioner of Customs vs Milwaukee Industries
GRN- 135253 December 9, 2004
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.:

Facts:
Milwaukee Industries is engaged in the importation of steel billets and manufactures of them into plates, sheets, pipers, rods etc. for local market of Feb 1, 1994, the steel billets arrived a representative of customs broker for Milwaukee presented to customs inspector a shipside permute and it took 6 days to discharge the cargo. The cargo was transported to the warehouse of respondent but “under guard” until a valid delivery permit was presented. Custom Intelligence and Investigation Division questioned the shipment for being transformed without import entry or payment of duties and taxes. Respondent settled the account while Special Assistant to petitioner was instructed to accept payment and facilitate release of the shipment. North understanding the acceptance and respondent’s payment district collection proceed with the seizure and forfeiture proceedings. Commissioner of Customs affirmed the district collector’s decision. CTA reversed.

Issue:
Whether or not the shipment was released to respondent and that respondent failed to comply with customs requirements to justify seizure and for failure of shipment.

Ruling:
CTA found and held that at the time of the transfer to Milwaukee’s factory, the same was not released but merely transformed or discharged under continuous customs guarding. Since the shipment was merely transfer under the custody of the BOC for all legal intents and purposes.
Section 1202 of TCC provides “Importation is deemed terminated upon payment of the duties, taxes and other charges due upon the articles…and the legal permit for withdrawal shall have been granted.
The seizure proceeding must fail.





R.V Marzan Freight vs. CA/ Shiela’s Manufacturing
GRN 128064

Facts:
Philfire issued insurance policy to R.V Marzan, owner of a customs bonded warehouse. Shiela’s manufacturing engaged in the garment business, the consignee of raw materials from Taiwan. The BOC treated the materials as subject to ordinary import taxes and were not immediate released to respondent. The consignee failed to file the requisite import entry and to claim the cargo.BOC authorized petitioners for stripping and safekeeping after 5 months, notice of abandonment giving respondents 15 days from notice to file entry the file cargoes without prejudice to right of the consignee to redeem articles cargoes would redeemed abandoned and be sold at public auction. After a month the declaration of abandonment has become final and executory but before inventory and sale public auction of goods the warehouse was burned. Philfire paid 12,000.00 for the warehouse. After the Lapse of more than 2 years from the arrival of the cargo, the private respondent filed a complaint for damaged before RTC. Petitioner arrived that there is no private of Contract between them since the cargo was received from BOC and that respondent failed to claim the cargo, pay taxes thus not entitled to insurance proceeds.

Issue:
Whether or not the trial court had jurisdiction to review and declare ineffective the declaration of the BOC in abandonment proceedings and that the government ipso facto became the owner thereof.

Ruling:
The declaration that the cargo was abandoned for the failure to file the import entry was ineffective because notice of proceedings of abandonment was not given to the consignee. Evidently, the resolution of this issue is within the exclusive competence of the District Collector of Customs, the Commissioner of Customs and within the appellate jurisdiction of CTA.
The rule has RTC has no review powers over such proceedings is anchored upon the policy of placing un necessary hindrance on the government drive not only to prevent smuggling and other frauds upon customs, but more importantly, to render effective and efficient the collection of import and export duties due the State, which enables the government to carry out the functions it has been instituted to the perform. The trial court should have dismissed the complaint without prejudice to the right of the private respondent to ventilate the issue before the Commissioner of the Customs and/or CTA.



Terminal Facilities TEFASCO/ Vs. PPA
GRN 135826 February 27, 2002
De Leon, Jr. &:

Facts:
Tefasco proposed to construct as specialized terminal complex with part facilities and a provision for sport services in Davao City. On May 7, 1976, PPA accepted the projects TOCs and was authorized to start work. Tefasco contracted dollar lessons concern from private commercial institution abroad to construct its specialized facilities and long after the ground breaking, PPA passed a resolution which imposed a construction; PPA issued another permit the provision of which states that 10% of arrastre and stevedoring gross income and 100% wharf age and berthing charges be given as government share it had paid and for damage as a result of alleged illegal exaction from its clients of 100% berthing and wharf age fees. RTC ruled for Tefasco.

Issue:
Whether or not the collection of 100% wharf age fees and berthing charge are valid.

Ruling:
The authorization for a Tefasco to construct a port was truly a binding construct between the parties. It was a 2-way advantage for both parties which were the consideration for the contract. The right- privilege dechotomy came to an end when courts realized that individuals should not be subjected to the unfettered whims of government officials to withhold privileges previously given them.
In as much as the part is privately owned and maintained, we rule that applicable rate for imported or exported articles loaded or unloaded thereat is not more than 100% but only 50%.
As regards berthing charges, the Court’s opinion is that only vessels berthing at the national ports arte liable for berthing fees. The Berthing fees imposed upon vessels berthing are national ports are applied by the national government for the maintenance ports. The national ports does not maintain municipal ports which are solely maintain by private entities or municipalities. Thus, PPA erred in collecting berthing fees.




Nestle Philippines, Inc. vs. CA
GRN 134114 July 6, 2001
De Leon, Jr. &:

Facts:
CTA Dismissed petitioners motion to grant refund on allegedly overpaid impost duties, on its various importations of milk and milk products in the amount of 5M. Petitioners were assessed customs duties and advance sales taxes by Collector of Customs for each separate importations on the basis of the published Home Consumption Value. Petitioners paid the same but under protests. On October 1986, petitioner finally failed a claim for refund of before BIR and the following day, filed the petition for review with CTA which ordered BIR to refund P 4,489 representing the overpaid advance and Sales Taxes. The refund for alleged overpaid customs duties amounting to P 5.008M were left with the collector of customs undecided after almost 6 years. On Aug 22, 1990, petition filed a petition for review with CTA dismissed for what of jurisdiction. Case was filed with CA on certiorari (Rule 45) but dismissed for CTA jurisdiction is not concurrent with the appellate jurisdiction of Commissioner since there was no decision yet from Collector from Customs.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is entitled for alleged overpayment of customs duties on importations thus be remanded to CTA for further review.

Ruling:
We find that the recommended remand of the case to CTA is warranted. For the proper verification and determination of the factual basis and merits of this petition and in order that the ends of substantial justice and fair play my be sub served. Tariff and Customs Code provides that in all claims for refund of customs duties are paid and upon receipts of such claims is mandated to verify the same by the record of his office. In such claim is found correct and in accordance with law, the collector shall certify the same to the commissioner with his recommendation together with all the necessary papers and documents.
Solutio indebt it’s misplaced because there is no factual showing that the collection was more than what is required of the petitioner when it made the importations. There is no factual finding yet that petitioner is indeed entitled to its claim of overpayment and if how much is he entitled.



CIR vs. Wyeth Suaco Lab
GRN-76281 September 30, 1991

Facts:
An investigation and examination of the books of accounts of Wyeth disclosed that Wyeth was paying royalties to Wyeth International and have also declared cash dividends on September 27, 1973 and these were paid on October 3, 1973. It allegedly failed to remit withholding tax at source and accrued royalties resulting to tax deficiency. Assessment notice were received on December1974 whereas letters/reply were sent on Feb 1975 protesting assessment and requesting their cancellation or withdrawal. On December 10, 1979 petitioner rendered a decision reducing the assessment of withholding tax at source. There after, petitioner issued a warrant of distrait of personal; property and warrant of levy real property. CTA decided in favor of respondent ratiocinating that an assessment of any internal revenue tax within the 5 years period of limitation may be collected by distrait of personal property and warrant of levy of real property. CTA decided in favor of respondent ratiocinating that an assessment of any internal revenue tax within the 5 years period of limitation may be collected by distained or levy by a proceeding in count but only if begun within 5 years after the assessment of the tax.

Issue:
Whether or not the right to collect deficiency tax at source and sales tax liabilities from private respondent is barred by prescription.

Ruling:
Settled is a rule that the prescription period provided by law to make collection by distrait or levy by proceeding in court is interrupted once a tax payers requests of reinvestigation or reconsideration of assessment when Wyeth, through SGV and Co protests the assessment and sought its reconsideration on Feb 1975, the prescription period was interrupted. This period started to run again when the BIR served the final assessment of Wyeth on Jan 2, 1980. Since the warrant of distrait and levy were served on Wyeth on March 12, 1980 then only about for months of the five year prescriptive period was used.