De Gala vs. De Gala

GRN L – 15756 February 15, 1992

Johnson, J.:

FACTS:

Plaintiff commenced an action to compel the respondent to recognize the plaintiff as his natural son. Respondent’s son Generoso, the only legitimate son of Pedro testified in court that Sinfroso was his brother by his father. Pedro objected to its admission upon the ground that it was impertinent. The lower court sustained the objection stating that Generoso was not an interested party in the case and his admission that Sinfroso was his brother would not entitle the latter to be recognized as natural son of the defendant.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the admission of Generoso be admissible as evidence for the compulsory recognition of the plaintiff.

RULING:
Generoso, the only legitimate son of the defendant, being a member of the latter’s family, his spontaneous admission, publicly made in open court, that the plaintiff was his brother, cannot be said to be “impertinent” for the purpose of proving the plaintiff’s claim; for that admission was a conduct on his part which tends to confirm the status claimed by the alleged natural child. Neither can it be said that the said only legitimate child was not an interested party in this case for he is a forced heir and his hereditary rights would be diminished with that recognition… while it is true that such admission of the legitimate son would not of itself, be sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to a compulsory recognition… it should have been admitted in evidence as a factum probandum – the uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural child. Such status cannot be proved by a single specific act or conduct of defendant’s family. It must necessarily be proved by showing a series of acts, conduct and circumstance indicative of the intention of the prilatine father to acknowledge his alleged natural child. Hence, to reject evidence of a single act or conduct or circumstance as being insufficient to prevent the status claimed, would be to prevent the claimant from proving it at all.

Daanan vs. Aspillera

GRN L-17305 November 28, 1962

FACTS:

Petitioners were holders of a certificate of public convenience for the operation of ice plant issued by Public Service Commission. For non operation, said certificate was cancelled and a new certificate was subsequently issued to cortisan & CO, to install and operate a 100ton ice plant, a motion for consideration by petitioners was denied by PSC, the decision was received on 21 July 1960. A petition for review was filed to SC on August 22, 1960.

ISSUE:

Whether or not SC may review the PSC decision after the lapse of 30 days from the date petitioner received the decision.

RULING:

The petition is denied for having been filed beyond the reglementary period.

Section 36 of Commonwealth Act No 146 which reorganized the PSC provides.

“any order, ruling or decision of the commission may be reviewed… within thirty days from the notification of such order, ruling or decision or in case a petition for the reconsideration of such order, ruling or decision is filed… within 15 days after notice of the order…”

De Gala vs. De Gala

GRN L – 15756 February 15, 1992

Johnson, J.:

FACTS:

Plaintiff commenced an action to compel the respondent to recognize the plaintiff as his natural son. Respondent’s son Generoso, the only legitimate son of Pedro testified in court that Sinfroso was his brother by his father. Pedro objected to its admission upon the ground that it was impertinent. The lower court sustained the objection stating that Generoso was not an interested party in the case and his admission that Sinfroso was his brother would not entitle the latter to be recognized as natural son of the defendant.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the admission of Generoso be admissible as evidence for the compulsory recognition of the plaintiff.

RULING:
Generoso, the only legitimate son of the defendant, being a member of the latter’s family, his spontaneous admission, publicly made in open court, that the plaintiff was his brother, cannot be said to be “impertinent” for the purpose of proving the plaintiff’s claim; for that admission was a conduct on his part which tends to confirm the status claimed by the alleged natural child. Neither can it be said that the said only legitimate child was not an interested party in this case for he is a forced heir and his hereditary rights would be diminished with that recognition… while it is true that such admission of the legitimate son would not of itself, be sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to a compulsory recognition… it should have been admitted in evidence as a factum probandum – the uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural child. Such status cannot be proved by a single specific act or conduct of defendant’s family. It must necessarily be proved by showing a series of acts, conduct and circumstance indicative of the intention of the prilatine father to acknowledge his alleged natural child. Hence, to reject evidence of a single act or conduct or circumstance as being insufficient to prevent the status claimed, would be to prevent the claimant from proving it at all.

Daanan vs. Aspillera

GRN L-17305 November 28, 1962

FACTS:

Petitioners were holders of a certificate of public convenience for the operation of ice plant issued by Public Service Commission. For non operation, said certificate was cancelled and a new certificate was subsequently issued to cortisan & CO, to install and operate a 100ton ice plant, a motion for consideration by petitioners was denied by PSC, the decision was received on 21 July 1960. A petition for review was filed to SC on August 22, 1960.

ISSUE:

Whether or not SC may review the PSC decision after the lapse of 30 days from the date petitioner received the decision.

RULING:

The petition is denied for having been filed beyond the reglementary period.

Section 36 of Commonwealth Act No 146 which reorganized the PSC provides.

“any order, ruling or decision of the commission may be reviewed… within thirty days from the notification of such order, ruling or decision or in case a petition for the reconsideration of such order, ruling or decision is filed… within 15 days after notice of the order…”

DOMAGAS vs. JENSEN

GRN 158407 158407 January 17,2005

Callejo, Sr. J.:

FACTS:

Petitioner Domagas filed for a forcible entry case against Jensen. Summons and complaint were not served on respondent because the latter was apparently out of the country but it was received by respondent’s brother Oscar who was then at the respondent’s house. The trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner. Respondent did not appeal. August 20, 2000, respondent filed a complaint against petitioner for the annulment of the decision of MTC since the service of summons was ineffective, the respondent being out of the country. The RTC decided in favor of Jensen since there was no valid service of the complaint and summons. The CA affirmed the decision, ruling that the case was an ejectment case which is an action quasi in rem.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the action of petitioner in the MTC against respondent is an action in personam or quasi in rem.

RULING:

The action of the petitioner fro forcible entry is a real action and one in personam. The settled rule is that the aim and object of an action determine its character. Whether a proceeding is in rem or in personam or in quasi in rem is determined by its nature and purpose, and by these only. A proceeding in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights and obligations brought against the person and is based on the jurisdiction of the person, although it may involve his right, or the exercise of ownership of, specific property, or seek to compel him to control or dispose of it in accordance with the mandate of the court. The purpose of a proceeding in personam is to impose, through the judgment of a court, some responsibility or liability directly upon the person of the defendant. Of this character are suits to compel a defendant to specifically perform some act or actions to fasten a pecuniary liability on him. An action in personam is said to be one which has for its object a judgment against a person, as distinguished from a judgment against the proprietary to determine its state… Actions for recovery of real property are in personam.

v Actions quasi in rem deal with the status, ownership or liability of a particular property but which are intended to operate on these questions only as between the particular parties to the proceedings and not to ascertain or cut off the rights or interest of all possible claimants. The judgments therein are binding only upon the parties who joined in the action.

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PAGTAKHAN et al. vs. Court of Industrial Relations

GRN L- 23867 June 10, 1971

Zaldivar, J.:

FACTS:

On May 30, 1964 La Perla (respondents) file a motion for reconsideration to the order of CIR judge which is adverse to the former, dated May 20, 1964. On June 18, 7964 employee-complaints filed their opposition to the motion for reconsideration and in turn, on July 7, 1964 respondents filed their reply to complaints’ opposition. The motion for reconsideration was heard on an argument before the CIR en banc on August 24, 1964. CIR en banc set aside the order of trial judge of May 20, 1964 and ordering the return of the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the filing of a motion to reconsider an interlocutory order of a trial judge has the effect of automatically elevating the case from the sala of the CIR trial judge to the CIR en banc thereby suspending the proceedings before the trial court until the CIR en banc will have resolved the motion for reconsideration.

RULING:

We are of the considered view that the CIR en banc erred in holding that the trial judge should have suspended the hearing of the case upon the filing by the respondents of a motion for the reconsideration of the trial court’s order denying respondent’s motion to dismiss. It is the settled rule that an order denying a motion to dismiss action is an interlocutory order, and that interlocutory order is not appealable.

The settled rule that no appeal should be allowed from an interlocutory order… “to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single action, which must necessarily suspend the hearing and decision on the merits of the case during the pendency appeal.” Thereby discouraging piecemeal appeals which delay the speedy disposition of the cases. The proceeding before one judge… which disposes of completely the case and gives an end to the litigation… unless the order is appealed… and the appeal should refer to a decision that is final which means a decision or order that has finally disposes of the pending action and nothing more can be done with it in the trial court.

Moran:

“… when the order of judgment does not dispose of the case completely but leaves something to be done, upon the merits, it is merely interlocutory.”

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QUELNAN vs. VHF PHILIPPINES

GRN 145911 July 7, 2004

Carpio-Morales, J.:

FACTS:

Petitioner purchased one condo unit from VHF from which he allegedly have overpaid in the amount of 270K. they agreed verbally to debit said amount for the purchase of another condo unit. Petitioner took possession of the second unit and later on found out that said unit was mortgaged and he was being charged the interests and penalties on the mortgage. An ejectment case was likewised filed against him. Petitioner failed to answer said case and after respondents presented the required documentary evidence. MeTC ordered his ejectment. Petitioner did not appeal this decision and he was in fact ejected from the unit. In 1994, petitioner filed a complaint for rescission (of the alleged verbal contract of sale) and damage against respondents. Petitioner’s counsel received the January 17, 1997 order declaring petitioner non-suited and accordingly dismissing the complaint on February 12, 1997. When petitioner’s counsel filed a manifestation and Ex-forte Motion, on January 24, 1997 an omnibus Motion to set aside said order, 12 days of the 15-day period had elapsed. The filing of the Omnibus Motion interrupted the period of appeal, and it began to run again when, on March 19, 1997 petitioner’s counsel received a copy of the Order of March 12, 1997 denying the Omnibus Motion.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appeal on the Decision was timely.

RULING:

The denial of the motion for reconsideration of an order of dismissal of a complaint is not an interlocutory order, but a final order as it puts end to the particular matte resolved, or settles definitely the matter therein disposed of, and nothing is left for the trial court to do other than execute the order.

Nothing being an interlocutory order, an order denying a motion for reconsideration of an order of dismissal of a complaint is effectively an appeal of the order of dismissal itself.

The reference by petitioner, in his notice of appeal, to the March 12, 1999 order denying his omnibus Motion… should does be deemed to refer to the order of January 17, 1999 which declared him not-suited and accordingly dismissed his complaint.

If the proscription against appealing an order denying a motion for reconsideration is applied to any order, than there would have been no need to specially mention in the both sections of the Rules 39 & 41, there can be no mistaking that what is proscribed is to appeal from a denial of a motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory order.

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APUYAN vs. HALDEMAN

GRN 129980 September 20, 2004

Azcuna, J.:

FACTS:

Apuyan filed for a petition for quieting of title against respondents. Respondents filed on answer alleging among other that they have been in possession of their respective properties since 1962 and that petitioner produced his title to the property through fraud. The trial court ordered the hearing suspended until the termination of the proceedings before the DENR. After DENR ruled in favor of petitioner herein, RTC held parties into a pre-trial agreement and subsequently ruled that petitioner was guilty of fraud and misrepresentation while respondents are the owners of the land in question by virtue of the documentary and oral evidence, including the dismissal of the ejectment case filed by petitioner against respondents. Plaintiff received a copy of the decision on October 17, 1996 and filed a motion for reconsideration on time. Reconsideration was denied and an appeal notice therefrom was filed but RTC ruled that plaintiff failed to perfect his appeal thus the order become final and executor. CA observed that “the notice of appeal filed with trial court on January 14, 1997 was not form the decision, but from the order denying the motion for reconsideration which cannot be done. It stated that although the notice of appeal prayed for the elevation of the entire records to the CA, it did not cure the defect in the notice of appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not CA erred in holding that the inadvertent omission in the petitioner’s notice of appeal to include the RTC’s decision as being appealed from is fatal to petitioner’s appeal.

RULING:

We rule in the affirmnative.

Section 9 of Rule 37 and Section 1 of Rule 41 of the present Rules of Civil Procedure… provide:

Sec 37. Remedy against denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration. An order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration is not appealable, the remedy being an appeal from the judgment or final order.

Sec 41. An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable.

In the case at bar, we consider that an appeal from the order denying the motion for reconsideration of the judgment of the trial court as an appeal from a final order. Then trial court’s decision dated January 7, 1997 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s decision dated October 9, 1996 is not an interlocutory order but a final order, as the trial court finally resolved therein the issues raised in the MR, which were already passed upon in the RTC’s decision. In effect, petitioner appealed from the final order of the trial court dated January 7, 1997 which appeal was filed on time.

Alvarez vs. Ramirez

GRN 143439

Sandoval – Gutierrez, J.;

FACTS:

Petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the CA for allowing the testimony of petitioner’s wife in a criminal proceeding where petitioner was accused for ransom. Private prosecutor in the said criminal case called the petitioner’s wife without objection from petitioner’s counsel. Wife testified that it was her estranged husband who poured and set the house of her sister on fire. A motion to disqualify the testimony of his wife was filed pursuant to rules on martial disqualification.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the wife can testify against her husband in a criminal case.

RULING:

The reason for the rule on martial disqualification are:

1. There is identity of interests between husband and wife;

2. If one were to testify for or against the other, there is consequent danger of perjury;

3. The policy of the law is to guard the security and confidence of private life, even at the risk of an occasional failure of justice and to prevent domestic disunion and unhappiness;

4. Where there is want of domestic tranquility there is danger of punishing one spouse through the hostile testimony of the other.

The offense of arson attributed to the husband impairs the conjugal relation between him and his wife. His act eradicates all the major aspects of marital life such as trust, confidence, respect and love by which virtues the conjugal relationship survives and flourishes… the evidence and facts presented reveal that the preservation of the marriage between petitioner and his wife is no longer an interest the State aims to protect.

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Dasmariñas Garments vs. Reyes/American Pres. Lines

GRN 108229 August 24, 1993

Narvasa, J.;

FACTS:

APL sued Dasmariñas Garments for sum of money at the hearing. Instead of presenting its witness, APL filed a motion praying that it intended to take the depositions of some Taiwan nationals. The lower court granted the deposition which was in compliance with the rules on taking of testimony by deposition upon written interrogatories under ROC. CA affirmed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a party could present its evidence by taking the deposition of its witness in a foreign jurisdiction before a private entity.

RULING:

Depositions are chiefly a mode of discovery. They are intended as a means to compel disclosure of facts resting in the knowledge of a party or other person which are relevant in some suit or proceeding in court. Depositions are principally made by law to the parties as a means of informing themselves of all the relevant facts; they are not therefore generally meant to be a substitute for the actual testimony in open court of a party witness. Leave of court is not necessary where the deposition is to be taken before a secretary or embassy or legation, consul gen. etc., and the defendants answer has already been served.

Depositions may be taken at any time after the institution of any action, whenever necessary or convenient. There is no rule that limits deposition. Taking only to the period of pre-trial or before it; no prohibition against the taking of deposition after pre-trial… the law authorizes the taking of depositions before or after an appeal is taken from the judgment of RTC “to perpetuate their testimony for use in event of further proceedings in court… or during the process of execution of a final and executor judgment.”

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Jonathan Landoil vs. Mangudadatu

GRN 155010 August 16, 2001

Panganiban, J.;

FACTS:

Respondents filed a complaint for damages against petitioner in the lower court. Trial proceeded without the participation of petitioner and declared it in default. Petitioner filed a motion for new trial but was denied. When the writ of execution was served, petitioner alleged that it is yet to receive the order of denial for the motion for new trial. A petition for prohibition was filed with CA and respondents submitted its opposition and attached to their pleading is a certification that the order denying the motion for new trial was no longer available for a deposition since trial, had already been terminated. It also opined that the alleged error committed by the trial court of disregarding the oral depositions, was certiorari or prohibition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the taking of oral deposition was proper under the circumstances.

RULING:

(A motion for new trial may be filed on the grounds of 1) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence that could not have been guarded against ordinary prudence, and by reason of which the aggrieved party’s rights have probably been impaired; 2) newly discovered evidence, that, with reasonable diligence,. The aggrieved party could not have discovered and produced at the trial; 3) and that if presented, would probably alter the result.)

A deposition may be taken with leave of court after jurisdiction has been obtained over any defendant or over property that is the subject of the action; or without such leave after an answer has been served. In keeping with the principle of promoting the just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding, depositions are allowed as a departure from the accepted and usual judicial proceedings of examining witness in open court where demeanor could be observed by the trial judge.

As a rule, depositions should be allowed absent any showing that taking them would prejudice any party.

Valenzuela vs. CA

GRN 131175 August 28, 2001

Buena, J.;

FACTS:

Private respondent de Guia spouses filed a complaint for specific performance against herein petitioner for the latter to execute a deed of sale in favor of the former. Valenzuela had sold the property to Quiason spouses thus, de Guia amended the complaint impleading the Quiason as defendant including other parties who may have acquired rights or interest in said property. RTC denied for its inclusion thus this petition for Certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an amendment be allowed in as much as it radically and substantially change the cause of action and theory of the case.

RULING:

Under Section 3, Rule 10 is not under the new rule that “the amendment may (now) substantially alter the cause of action or defense.” This should only be true when despite a substantial change or alteration in the cause of action or defense, the amendments sought to be made shall serve the higher interests of substantial justice, and prevent delay and equally promote the landable objectives of the rules which is to secure a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.

Vda de Caruzo vs. Carriaga Jr.

GRN 75109-10 June 28, 1989

Regalado, J.;

FACTS:

Petitioners are children of Gabina Machoca. The latter had her land mortgaged to Ang for 425 pesos. An additional sum of P175 was again barrowed, total amount borrowed was P600. Gabina noticed that the instrument was a contract of sale and demanded a reformation from Ang. The latter prepared a deed of agreement stipulating among others that Ang obligates himself to resell the property to the vendor within 3 years for the same amount. Before that 3 years, Ang transferred the lot title to his name. Petitioners remained in possession of the lot until 1977 (since 1954). Respondents filed an unlawful detainer case and received a favorable order. During the pendency of the case, petitioners Special Civil Case for removal of cloud on the title. The complaint was dismissed on the ground of res judicata.

ISSUE:

Whether or not res judicata is present in the case.

RULING:

The doctrine of res judicata lays down two main rules: (1) the judgment or decree of a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes the parties and their privies to the litigation and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the same cause of action either before the same or any other tribemal or, (BAR BY FORMER JUDGMENT. (2) any right, fact or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a competent court in which judgment or decree is rendered on the merit is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot be again litigated between the parties and their privies whether or not the claim, or demand, purpose or subject matter of the two suits are the same. (CONCLUSIVENESS OF JUDGMENT)

The following requisites must concur for R.J. a) the former judgment or order must be final b) it must be a judgment or order on the merits, that is, it was rendered after a consideration of the evidence or stipulations submitted by the parties at the trial of the case; c) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; d) there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter and cause of action.

The dismissed or removal of cloud had become final for failure of petitioners to appeal. While the dismissed was for failure to prosecute, it had the effect of the adjudication on the merits since the court did not direct that the dismissed was without prejudice.

Lechugas vs. CA

GRN L-39972 & L-40300

August 6, 1986

FACTS:

Petitioner filed an unlawful entry case against private respondent “the Loza’s”. Another case was filed for recovery and possession of the same property and both cases was tried jointly. Petitioner testified that she bought the land from Lasangue in 1950. Private respondent contended that the same land in question was bought by their father from the father of petitioner in 1941. Plaintiff’s vendor testified for the defendant stating that she sold the south part of the land which is lot 5522 not lot 5456 which plaintiff claims.

IISUE:

Whether or not the court of appeals erred in considering, parol evidence over the objection of petitioner.

RULING:

The appellate court acted correctly in upholding the trial court’s action in admitting the testimony of Leoncia. Petitioner alleges that lot 5522 was sold to her by Leonora, not Leoncia, who was never presented as witness in any proceeding in the lower court… the parol evidence rule does not apply and may not properly be involved by either party to litigation against the other, where at least one of the parties to the suit is not a party or a privy of a party to a written instrument in the question and does not base a claim on the instrument or assert a right originating in the instrument or the relation established thereby.

The rule is not applicable where the controversy is between one of the parties to the document and third persons. Through the testimony of Leoncia, it was shown that what she really intended to sell is lot 5522 but not being able to read and write and fully relying on the good faith of her cousin, petitioner, she just placed her thumb mark on a piece of paper.

Marbella – Bobis vs. Bobis

GRN 138509 July 31, 2000

336 SCRA 747

Ynares –Santiago, J.:

FACTS:

Respondent contracted his second marriage to petitioners notwithstanding the subsistence of a previous marriage. A third marriage was allegedly contracted by respondent thus petitioner filed for a bigamy case. Thereafter, respondent filed an action for the absolute nullity of his first marriage on the ground that it was celebrated without a marriage license.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a previous marriage constitutes prejudicial question.

RULING:

A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. It must appear not only that the civil case involves facts upon which the criminal action is based, but also that the resolution of the issues raised in the civil action would necessarily be determinative of the criminal case.

In this case, any decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that respondent entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to the determination of the criminal charge.

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Beltran vs. PP/Judge Juazon

GRN 137567 334 SCRA 106

Buena, J.:

FACTS:

Petitioner filed a petition for nullity of marriage against her wife for 24 years. Wife answered that it was petitioner who left the family house and lived with a paramour. A concubinage case was filed by wife and petitioner argued that the pendency of a case for declaration of nullity of marriage posed a prejudicial question.

ISSUE:

Whether or not pendency of the case for nullity of marriage a prejudicial question to the concubinage case.

RULING:

The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two essential elements: 1) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and 2) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

In the criminal case of concubinage, the accused need not present a final judgment declaring his marriage void for he can adduce evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of his marriage other than proof of a final judgment declaring his marriage void.

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Prado vs. PP/Judge Sison

GRN – L – 17652 December 26, 1984

133 SCRA 602

Melencio-Herrera, J.;

FACTS:

On August 5, 1971, Petitioner was charged with the crime of bigamy, where she contracted a second marriage in Vietnam. Petitioner moved to dismiss on jurisdiction grounds but was denied. Petition for certiorari and prohibition were with S.C. but the same was dismissed for being premature. In 1973, petitioner filed for annulment of her second marriage reasoning that her consent thereto was obtained through force.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a pending suit for annulment of marriage constitutes prejudicial question in a bigamy case.

RULING:

For a civil action to be considered prejudicial, the following requisites must be present: 1) the civil case involved facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based; 2) in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined; 3) jurisdiction to try said question musty be lodged in another tribunal.

But the mere filing of an annulment case does not give rise to a prejudicial questions.

PART I
I
On March 12, 2008, Mabini was charged with Murder for fatally stabbing Emilio.
To prove the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation, the prosecution introduced on December 11, 2009 a text message, which Mabini’s estranged wife Gregoria had sent to Emilio on the eve of his death, reading: “Honey, pa2tayin u ni Mabini. Mtgal n nyang plano i2. Mg ingat u bka ma tsugi k.”
A. A subpoena ad testificandum was served on Gregoria for her to be presented for the purpose of identifying her cellphone and the text message. Mabini objected to her presentation on the ground of marital privilege. Resolve. (3%)
B. Suppose Mabini’s objection in question A was sustained. The prosecution thereupon announced that it would be presenting Emilio’s wife Graciana to identify Emilio’s cellphone bearing Gregoria’s text message. Mabini objected again. Rule on the objection. (2%)
C. If Mabini’s objection in question B was overruled, can he object to the presentation of the text message on the ground that it is hearsay? (2%)
D. Suppose that shortly before he expired, Emilio was able to send a text message to his wife Graciana reading “Nasaksak ako. D na me makahinga. Si Mabini ang may gawa ni2.” Is this text message admissible as a dying declaration? Explain. (3%)
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II
On August 13, 2008, A, as shipper and consignee, loaded on the M/V Atlantis in Legaspi City 100,000 pieces of century eggs. The shipment arrived in Manila totally damaged on August 14, 2008. A filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila a complaint against B Super Lines, Inc. (B Lines), owner of the M/V Atlantis, for recovery of damages amounting to P167,899. He attached to the complaint the Bill of Lading.
A.
B.
C.
B Lines filed a Motion to Dismiss upon the ground that the Regional Trial Court has exclusive original jurisdiction over “all actions in admiralty and maritime” claims. In his Reply, A contended that while the action is indeed “admiralty and maritime” in nature, it is the amount of the claim, not the nature of the action, that governs jurisdiction. Pass on the Motion to Dismiss. (3%)
The MeTC denied the Motion in question A. B Lines thus filed an Answer raising the defense that under the Bill of Lading it issued to A, its liability was limited to P10,000.
At the pre-trial conference, B Lines defined as one of the issues whether the stipulation limiting its liability to P10,000 binds A. A countered that this was no longer in issue as B Lines had failed to deny under oath the Bill of Lading. Which of the parties is correct? Explain. (3%)
On July 21, 2009, B Lines served on A a “Notice to Take Deposition,” setting the deposition on July 29, 2009 at 8:30 a.m. at the office of its counsel in Makati. A failed to appear at the deposition-taking, despite notice. As counsel for B Lines, how would you proceed? (3%)
Remedial Law Page 4 of 13
III
Anabel filed a complaint against B for unlawful detainer before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Candaba, Pampanga. After the issues had been joined, the MTC dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction after noting that the action was one for accion publiciana.
Anabel appealed the dismissal to the RTC which affirmed it and accordingly dismissed her appeal. She elevates the case to the Court of Appeals, which remands the case to the RTC. Is the appellate court correct? Explain. (3%)
IV
X was driving the dump truck of Y along Cattleya Street in Sta. Maria, Bulacan. Due to his negligence, X hit and injured V who was crossing the street. Lawyer L, who witnessed the incident, offered his legal services to V.
V, who suffered physical injuries including a fractured wrist bone, underwent surgery to screw a metal plate to his wrist bone.
On complaint of V, a criminal case for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Serious Physical Injuries was filed against X before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Sta. Maria. Atty. L, the private prosecutor, did not reserve the filing of a separate civil action.
V subsequently filed a complaint for Damages against X and Y before the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan in Urdaneta where he resides. In his “Certification Against Forum Shopping,” V made no mention of the pendency of the criminal case in Sta. Maria.
A. Is V guilty of forum shopping? (2%)
Remedial Law Page 5 of 13
B. Instead of filing an Answer, X and Y move to dismiss the complaint for damages on the ground of litis pendentia. Is the motion meritorious? Explain. (2%)
C. Suppose only X was named as defendant in the complaint for damages, may he move for the dismissal of the complaint for failure of V to implead Y as an indispensable party? (2%)
D. X moved for the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case to await the decision in the civil case. For his part, Y moved for the suspension of the civil case to await the decision in the criminal case. Which of them is correct? Explain. (2%)
E. Atty. L offered in the criminal case his affidavit respecting what he witnessed during the incident. X’s lawyer wanted to cross-examine Atty. L who, however, objected on the ground of lawyer-client privilege. Rule on the objection. (2%)
V
Charisse, alleging that she was a resident of Lapu-Lapu City, filed a complaint for damages against Atlanta Bank before the RTC of Lapu-Lapu City, following the dishonor of a check she drew in favor of Shirley against her current account which she maintained in the bank’s local branch.
The bank filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground that it failed to state a cause of action, but it was denied. It thus filed an Answer.
A. In the course of the trial, Charisse admitted that she was a US citizen residing in Los Angeles, California and that she was temporarily billeted at the Pescado Hotel in Lapu-Lapu City, drawing the bank to file another motion to dismiss, this time on the ground of improper venue, since Charisse is not a resident of Lapu-Lapu City.
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Charisse opposed the motion citing the “omnibus motion rule.” Rule on the motion. (3%)
B. Suppose Charisse did not raise the “omnibus motion rule,” can the judge proceed to resolve the motion to dismiss? Explain. (3%)
C. Suppose the judge correctly denied the second motion to dismiss and rendered judgment in favor of Charisse, ordering the bank to pay her P100,000 in damages plus legal interest. The judgment became final and executory in 2008. To date, Charisse has not moved to execute the judgment. The bank is concerned that its liability will increase with the delay because of the interest on the judgment award.
(3%)
As counsel of the bank, what move should you take?
VI
Antique dealer Mercedes borrowed P1,000,000 from antique collector Benjamin. Mercedes issued a postdated check in the same amount to Benjamin to cover the debt.
On the due date of the check, Benjamin deposited it but it was dishonored. As despite demands, Mercedes failed to make good the check, Benjamin filed in January 2009 a complaint for collection of sum of money before the RTC of Davao.
Mercedes filed in February 2009 her Answer with Counterclaim, alleging that before the filing of the case, she and Benjamin had entered into a dacion en pago agreement in which her vintage P1,000,000 Rolex watch which was taken by Benjamin for sale on commission was applied to settle her indebtedness; and that she incurred expenses in defending what she termed a “frivolous lawsuit.” She accordingly prayed for P50,000 damages.
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A. Benjamin soon after moved for the dismissal of the case. The trial court accordingly dismissed the complaint. And it also dismissed the Counterclaim.
Mercedes moved for a reconsideration of the dismissal of the Counterclaim. Pass upon Mercedes’ motion. (3%)
B. Suppose there was no Counterclaim and Benjamin’s complaint was not dismissed, and judgment was rendered against Mercedes for P1,000,000. The judgment became final and executory and a writ of execution was correspondingly issued.
Since Mercedes did not have cash to settle the judgment debt, she offered her Toyota Camry model 2008 valued at P1.2 million. The Sheriff, however, on request of Benjamin, seized Mercedes’ 17th century ivory image of the La Sagrada Familia estimated to be worth over P1,000,000.
Was the Sheriff’s action in order? (3%)
VII
As Cicero was walking down a dark alley one midnight, he saw an “owner-type jeepney” approaching him. Sensing that the occupants of the vehicle were up to no good, he darted into a corner and ran. The occupants of the vehicle − elements from the Western Police District − gave chase and apprehended him.
The police apprehended Cicero, frisked him and found a sachet of 0.09 gram of shabu tucked in his waist and a Swiss knife in his secret pocket, and detained him thereafter. Is the arrest and body-search legal? (3%)
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PART II VIII
Dominique was accused of committing a violation of the Human Security Act. He was detained incommunicado, deprived of sleep, and subjected to water torture. He later allegedly confessed his guilt via an affidavit.
After trial, he was acquitted on the ground that his confession was obtained through torture, hence, inadmissible as evidence.
In a subsequent criminal case for torture against those who deprived him of sleep and subjected him to water torture, Dominique was asked to testify and to, among other things, identify his above-said affidavit of confession. As he was about to identify the affidavit, the defense counsel objected on the ground that the affidavit is a fruit of a poisonous tree. Can the objection be sustained? Explain. (3%)
IX
In a prosecution for rape, the defense relied on Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) evidence showing that the semen found in the private part of the victim was not identical with that of the accused’s. As private prosecutor, how will you dispute the veracity and accuracy of the results of the DNA evidence? (3%)
X
Marinella is a junior officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines who claims to have personally witnessed the malversation of funds given by US authorities in connection with the Balikatan exercises.
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Marinella alleges that as a result of her exposé, there are operatives within the military who are out to kill her. She files a petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo against, among others, the Chief of Staff but without alleging that the latter ordered that she be killed.
Atty. Daro, counsel for the Chief of Staff, moves for the dismissal of the Petition for failure to allege that his client issued any order to kill or harm Marinella. Rule on Atty. Daro’s motion. Explain. (3%)
XI
X was arrested for the alleged murder of a 6-year old lad. He was read his Miranda rights immediately upon being apprehended.
In the course of his detention, X was subjected to three hours of non-stop interrogation. He remained quiet until, on the 3rd hour, he answered “yes” to the question of whether “he prayed for forgiveness for shooting down the boy.” The trial court, interpreting X’s answer as an admission of guilt, convicted him.
On appeal, X’s counsel faulted the trial court in its interpretation of his client’s answer, arguing that X invoked his Miranda rights when he remained quiet for the first two hours of questioning. Rule on the assignment of error. (3%)
XII
In a prosecution for murder, the prosecutor asks accused Darwin if he had been previously arrested for violation of the Anti- Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. As defense counsel, you object. The trial court asks you on what ground/s. Respond. (3%)
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XIII
Policemen brought Lorenzo to the Philippine General Hospital (PGH) and requested one of its surgeons to immediately perform surgery on him to retrieve a packet of 10 grams of shabu which they alleged was swallowed by Lorenzo.
Suppose the PGH agreed to, and did perform the surgery, is the package of shabu admissible in evidence? Explain. (3%)
XIV
Czarina died single. She left all her properties by will to her friend Duqueza. In the will, Czarina stated that she did not recognize Marco as an adopted son because of his disrespectful conduct towards her.
Duqueza soon instituted an action for probate of Czarina’s will. Marco, on the other hand, instituted intestate proceedings. Both actions were consolidated before the RTC of Pasig. On motion of Marco, Duqueza’s petition was ordered dismissed on the ground that the will is void for depriving him of his legitime. Argue for Duqueza. (5%)
XV
Pedrillo, a Fil-Am permanent resident of Los Angeles, California at the time of his death, bequeathed to Winston a sum of money to purchase an annuity.
Upon Pedrillo’s demise, his will was duly probated in Los Angeles and the specified sum in the will was in fact used to purchase an annuity with XYZ of Hong Kong so that Winston would receive the equivalent of US$1,000 per month for the next 15 years.
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Wanting to receive the principal amount of the annuity, Winston files for the probate of Pedrillo’s will in the Makati RTC. As prayed for, the court names Winston as administrator of the estate.
Winston now files in the Makati RTC a motion to compel XYZ to account for all sums in its possession forming part of Pedrillo’s estate. Rule on the motion. (5%)
XVI
Sal Mineo died intestate, leaving a P1 billion estate. He was survived by his wife Dayanara and their five children.
Dayanara filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration. Charlene, one of the children, filed an opposition to the petition, alleging that there was neither an allegation nor genuine effort to settle the estate amicably before the filing of the petition. Rule on the opposition. (5%)
XVII
What is “res judicata in prison grey”? (2%)
XVIII
While window-shopping at the mall on August 4, 2008, Dante lost his organizer including his credit card and billing statement. Two days later, upon reporting the matter to the credit card company, he learned that a one-way airplane ticket was purchased online using his credit card for a flight to Milan in mid- August 2008. Upon extensive inquiry with the airline company, Dante discovered that the plane ticket was under the name of one Dina Meril. Dante approaches you for legal advice.
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A. What is the proper procedure to prevent Dina from leaving the Philippines? (2%)
B. Suppose an Information is filed against Dina on August 12, 2008 and she is immediately arrested. What pieces of electronic evidence will Dante have to secure in order to prove the fraudulent online transaction? (2%)
XIX 1. Enumerate the requisites of a “trial in absentia” (2%) and
a “promulgation of judgment in absentia” (2%). 2. Name two instances where the trial court can hold the
accused civilly liable even if he is acquitted. (2%)
XX
Azenith, the cashier of Temptation Investments, Inc. (Temptation, Inc.) with principal offices in Cebu City, is equally hated and loved by her co-employees because she extends cash advances or “vales” to her colleagues whom she likes. One morning, Azenith discovers an anonymous letter inserted under the door of her office threatening to kill her.
Azenith promptly reports the matter to her superior Joshua, who thereupon conducts an internal investigation to verify the said threat.
Claiming that the threat is real, Temptation, Inc. opts to transfer Azenith to its Palawan Office, a move she resists in view of the company’s refusal to disclose the results of its investigation.
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Decrying the move as a virtual deprivation of her employment, Azenith files a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) to enjoin Temptation, Inc. from transferring her on the ground that the company’s refusal to provide her with a copy of the investigation results compromises her right to life, liberty and privacy.
Resolve the petition. Explain. (5%)
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